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Open Questions in Open Source: Exploring Incentives,
Licenses and Competition
Vidya Atal and Kameshwari Shankary

Abstract
Open Source Software (OSS) has grown in importance over the last few decades
and now constitutes an important part of the software market particularly in mobile
and web technology. In this paper, we provide a simple theoretical framework for analyzing currently unexamined issues regarding developers’participation in open source
software and competition between open source and proprietary software. We start
by looking at the upstream market where developers voluntarily contribute e¤ort into
the development of OSS without claiming any copyright for their contributions. We
explore the relationship between open source licensing and developers’e¤ort provision
and suggest an empirical test of developers’ motivation based on the results of our
model. We also look at issues of competition in the software market downstream and
provide some conjectures of how proprietary competition can in‡uence upstream OSS
development under di¤erent license regimes.
(JEL Classi…cations: L17, L24, D4, O3)

1

Introduction

Open Source Software (OSS) has always presented a special dilemma to economists because
of the way software development occurs in the OSS production model. Developers make
voluntary contributions to developing the software. But traditional copyright protection is
absent from OSS so that no single developer can claim ownership. This calls into question
the incentives for developers’e¤ort investment when they cannot appropriate the value of
their investment. While the lack of copyright protection poses an existential question for
OSS, it raises an interesting paradox for the survival of proprietary software at the other end.
Typically, OSS is distributed freely to all users and hence it is important to understand how
proprietary competitors respond to price competition from OSS without being foreclosed. In
this paper, we examine issues on both ends of the OSS process and provide some interesting
avenues for empirical and theoretical research.
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1.1

Motives and Licensing

What motivates software developers to participate in OSS development? This question has
intrigued researchers because there is no explicit monetary mechanism to compensate OSS
developers for their e¤ort. Research on OSS developers has identi…ed three possible motivations. First is simply an ideological or altruistic motive to participate in the “free and open
software”movement (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005.) Richard Stallman, a computer programmer
who has forcefully pushed the philosophy that all software development should be open, has a
strong following among open source developers. Beyond ideological or altruistic motivations,
however, there are two economic bene…ts that open source provides to developers. First is a
direct user bene…t to developers as they improve the quality of a software program for their
own use. (Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; Johnson, 2002). In such user-based models of
open source development, OSS is viewed as a public good the value of which is determined
by the aggregate voluntary contributions by individual developers. Such models inevitably
predict that developers’e¤ort under OSS will be less than that under proprietary production
which internalizes e¤ort externalities. Second, there is also some evidence to suggest that
OSS developers use their contributions to OSS as a signal to potential employers about their
programming ability or to gain reputational bene…ts from solving complex programming
problems (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Spiegel, 2009.) Unlike the public good model, such labor
market signaling and reputational gains are private bene…ts to the programmer and hence
do not entail any public good under-provision problems.
The question of incentives and developers’participation is also closely tied to software
licensing. OSS is often equated with a copyleft license where all users and developers have
the right to modify and distribute the software without worrying about copyright claims.
Yet, this applies only to the most restrictive form of OSS licensing. In reality, there are many
di¤erent OSS licensing regimes that vary in the extent to which developers must surrender
their copyright claims on their modi…cations. Restrictive licenses, such as the GNU Public
License (GPL), force all derivative works to use the same open source license thus ensuring
that the software is never made proprietary at any stage of its development. But there are
less restrictive licenses, such as the Apache license and the Berkeley Software Distribution
(BSD) license, that allow modi…ed software to be made proprietary. The licensing terms
provide interesting trade-o¤s between the incentives for developers to participate in open
source projects and this in turn has implications for the quality of the …nal software product.
A few papers have empirically examined the relationship between open source license and
software development and there is a general consensus among them that restrictive licenses
are associated with lower levels of participation and performance compared to non-restrictive
licenses (Subramaniam et al., 2009; Comino et al., 2007; Lerner and Tirole, 2005; Fershtman
and Gandal, 2007.)
One of the limitations of existing research has been that, while the issue of motives has
largely been con…ned to theoretical modelling, the e¤ect of licensing has primarily been
studied empirically. Even the empirical research on licensing only draw correlations between
participation and OSS licensing. To our knowledge, there are no structural models of licensing and participation that would explain observed empirical regularities and shed light on
the mechanism by which license choice a¤ects software outcomes. On the other hand, although there is a rather well-developed theoretical literature on di¤erent motives governing
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OSS development, data has not been brought to bear to identify and isolate the motives
governing OSS participation. Further, existing research, both theoretical and empirical,
ignores crucial interactions between licensing and motives by studying them in isolation of
each other. Atal and Shankar (2015) is the only paper to our knowledge that provides an
integrated model of motives and OSS licensing. That paper examines both software quality
and optimal licensing choice. The paper models di¤erent stages of software development and
assigns di¤ering motivations to developers at each stage. So developers receive reputational
bene…ts in the early stages of software design and then user-bene…ts at a later stage after the
software is (commercially) usable. Software licensing determines whether they receive reputational bene…ts in the design stage and how much of the software value can be appropriated
as user-surplus at a later stage.
In Section 2 of the current paper, we set-up a simple model that simultaneously incorporates developers’ motives (both reputational and user-driven) as well as di¤erent OSS
licensing. Although preliminary, we provide a theoretical framework to explain empirical
evidence on the e¤ects of licensing on software development; and we also propose a way to
elicit developer motives based on observed software outcomes and license. Unlike Atal and
Shankar (2015), we do not make any assumptions on motives governing di¤erent stages of
software development. Hence the current model is intended to be a more robust speci…cation
that can be applied to a software at any stage of development.

1.2

Product Market Competition

Over the decades, the competitive landscape of software technology has changed considerably
with OSS gaining steady signi…cance in mobile and cloud computing technology. The leading
webserver, Apache’s HTTP, is open source and it controls more than 50 percent of the
market, far ahead of proprietary Microsoft which has a slim 20 percent share. Google’s
Android OS which is also released under the Apache license controls more than 90 percent
of the market. With open source playing a more and more important role in the future
of software, it is crucial to understand its implications for the market landscape. Research
on this particularly important becuase the nature of competition with OSS is substantively
di¤erent than with a proprietary seller. Whereas in a proprietary product, the downstream
market is delinked from the upstream market where production occurs, in the OSS model,
production and consumption often occur simultaneously as many developers who produce
the software also assume the role of consumers. Hence the term “user-developer” is often
applied in the context of OSS. This fundamentally changes the way in which OSS competes
with proprietary software.
A growing economic literature deals with the relationship between OSS and traditional
proprietary …rms. Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2006), Mustonen (2003) and Athey
and Ellison (2014) look at the presence of OSS a¤ecting price and quality choices for the
proprietary …rm. Jaisingh et al. (2008-9) and Atal and Shankar (2015) look at how the nature
of competition changes when the proprietary …rm faces an OSS competitor compared to
when it faces another proprietary competitor. As with the research on modelling developers’
motives, OSS licensing has generally not been addressed in models of software competition.
Since developers’ participation and OSS outcomes depend on the type of license adopted,
competition between a proprietary software and OSS with a non-restrictive license is likely
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to yield a di¤erent market outcome than competition between proprietary software and
OSS with a restrictive license. Llanes and de Elejalde (2013) do delve into the issue of
restrictiveness of OSS licenses in looking at software competition; however, they do not
model developers’participation.
We extend our model of developers’participation to include subsequent product market
competition. In doing so, we examine how the choice of license a¤ects product market competition with an existing proprietary good. Further, we also provide some conjectures about
how competition can in‡uence developers’participation under di¤erent OSS licenses. Our
preliminary model shows that competition a¤ects OSS developers’participation di¤erently
depending on the type of license it employs.

2

The Model

Consider an OSS project with N > 1 user-developers who exert e¤ort to develop the software
and then consume the …nal software product. Software development process has two stages.
First, the N developers design the software by exerting e¤ort ei with i = 1; 2::N . Marginal
cost of e¤ort for each developer is c > 0. There is a stochastic process that determines
how e¤ort translates into output. The value generated by developer i’s e¤ort is di = ei "i ;
i:i:d:
U [0; 2] and > 0 is the marginal value of the developer’s contribution. The
where "i
N
P
value of the software (v) is the total contribution from all developers, i.e., v = di . Under
i=1

a uniform distribution for "i , the expected value then becomes E (v) =

N
P

ei . Once

i=1

developed, the resulting software is then commercialized and distributed to users under the
terms of the software license. If the license is non-restrictive, denoted by N R, i.e., it allows
the software to be made proprietary (such as BSD, or Apache), the …nal product is sold at a
positive price. If, however, the OSS license is restrictive, denoted by R, all the software code
including its commercialization is kept open to users resulting in a zero price of the software.

2.1

E¤ort Provision and Licensing

Suppose e¤ort provision by developers is potentially motivated by two factors. First, developers get user value from consuming the …nal software. Second, in OSS, since developer’s
e¤ort into software design is kept open and public, the developer who produces the highest
design value di also receives a reputational prize (S 0) for her innovation. This prize can
be interpreted as a reputational payo¤ to the developer from solving a coding problem or it
could be a labor market prize in terms of signaling her ability to prospective employers.
Let us start by looking at the outcome in a proprietary model where a proprietary …rm
determines developers’ e¤ort in order to maximize pro…ts. Since the …rm does not make
developers’contributions public, by de…nition, there is no reputational payo¤ to developers.
To keep the labor market dynamics simple, assume that the developer’s reservation wage is
zero. Hence the …rm pays every developer a wage exactly equal to her cost of e¤ort. The total
N
P
wage cost is then
cei . In the consumers’ market, once the software has been produced,
i=1
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the expected monopoly price is the value to each user, i.e.,

N
P

ei . Thus, developers do

i=1

not get any surplus as users or workers. Pro…ts are

=N

N
P

i=1

ei

N
P

cei . In a symmetric

i=1

c
equilibrium, e¤ort provision under a proprietary license is ep = 0 if < Nc ; if
; then
N
ep = 1.
Next let us move to the most restrictive OSS license where the market price of the software is trivially zero. Here developers receive a user bene…t from their contribution to the
software. Moreover, the winning contributor receives "the reputational prize, S. So !
e¤ort, e#i ,
P
is chosen to maximize developer i’s expected payo¤ P (ei ; ej6=i ) S +
ei + ej
cei ,
j6=i

where P (ei ; ej6=i ) is developer i’s probability of winning, given that the other (N 1) developers choose e¤ort ej6=i .1 The symmetric equilibrium in e¤ort is as follows. For S NN 1 c or
c NN 1 S, the symmetric equilibrium in e¤ort is er = 1. For S < NN 1 c and < c NN 1 S;
er = NN 1 (c S ) .
Comparing e¤orts across the proprietary and R licenses, er could be higher or less than
ep . For example, if S = 0 so that er is driven solely by user-bene…ts, er ep and the value of
the OSS is constrained by the standard public good under-provision problem. But if < Nc
and S c, then er > ep . In other words, if user-based motives are weak while reputational
motives are strong, a restrictive OSS can outperform the proprietary model.
Finally, let us consider the N R license. Here the design of the software is kept open.
But once it has been developed, the …nal commercial product can be made proprietary and
sold at a positive monopoly price to users. Assume that the developer with the highest
value of e¤ort makes the software proprietary. Now each developer’s payo¤, if she has the
highest di , is the reputational
" prize plus expected
!# monopoly pro…t from commercializing
P
the product, i.e. P (ei ; ej6=i ) S + N
ei + ej
cei : The symmetric equilibrium e¤ort
j6=i

1
c NN 1 S . If S < NN 1 c and
is then given by enr = 1 if S
(N 2 N +1)
S
.
< (N 2 1N +1) c NN 1 S ; then
(N 2 N +1)
Since N > 1, a nonrestrictive OSS weakly outperforms both a restrictive OSS as well as
the proprietary software. But it is interesting to note that the di¤erence between the two
OSS licenses disappears when S is high (i.e., for S NN 1 c); and the OSS licenses provide the
same e¤ort as under a proprietary license when is high. This result can be used empirically
to back out developers’motivations in any software project. If all else equal, di¤erence in
e¤orts between a proprietary license and a non-restrictive OSS license is signi…cant, while
developers’ participation is similar between the two OSS licenses, it implies that software
development is motivated more by reputational bene…ts from participating rather than user
bene…ts from the software.
N
c or
N 1
N 1
enr = N c

1

The derivation of this expression is provided in the Appendix.
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2.2

Product Market Competition and OSS Licensing

Our model of e¤ort provision can be extended to analyze how licensing in‡uences entry and
competition in the software market. In this section, we provide a preliminary analysis of such
a model. Assume that there is already an incumbent proprietary …rm selling software B of
value vB to users. N developers exert e¤ort into developing a new software which we denote
by A. The realized value of this software is vA . The game now has two stages. The model
described in the previous subsection occurs in the …rst stage with developers exerting e¤ort
to produce software A. In the second stage, there is price competition between softwares
A and B. Assume that users buy the higher valued software if indi¤erent and if they are
indi¤erent between A and B, they choose A. To focus on the e¤ects of competition on OSS
development, we set S = 0 (i.e., developers are only driven by user bene…ts) and = 1.
Looking at the second stage of the game, if A is developed under a restrictive OSS
license, its price is pA = 0. If vA
vB ; then all users buy the new software and B is
e¤ectively foreclosed from the market. Users get a surplus of vA . If, however, vA < vB , then
users will buy B as long as (vB pB ) vA . This means that the proprietor of B charges
pB = (vB vA ) and all users consume B. Note however that the user surplus is still vA . This
gives us a striking result that since user surplus does not depend on vB , developers’e¤ort
in the …rst stage is una¤ected by the presence of proprietary competition. Thus equilibrium
e¤ort in stage 1 is identical to what we derived in the previous subsection. This is, however,
not the case for any other license.
For example, consider Bertrand price competition when A is developed under a proprietary license. If vA
vB , then pA = (vA vB ), and total pro…t to proprietor A is
N (vA vB ) N c. Whereas if vA < vB , …rm A makes zero pro…ts. Since the highest value
that vA can take is 2N , if vB > 2N c, then vA < vB for all ei and "i . In this case,
proprietary production for a new software never occurs. On the other hand, from Section
2.1, we know that under a restrictive OSS license, A is developed for c low enough. Thus
even without any signaling bene…ts, it is possible for a restrictive OSS license to beat the
proprietary model when there is a high value incumbent software proprietor in the market.
Looking at a N R license for A, price competition in stage 2 is the same as with proprietary
production. However, expected surplus to the developer that drives …rst stage e¤ort provision
is di¤erent. If vA < vB , then every developer buys B and receives a user surplus of vA because
pB = (vB vA ). If vA
vB ; the winning developer who is the proprietor of A consumes
A herself and also sells it to the remaining (N 1) developers at pA = (vA vB ) to get a
surplus of vA + (N 1) (vA vB ); while the remaining developers who buy A at pA receive
a surplus of vB . Since the surplus in N R depends upon v, comparing the N R license to a R
license we can say that competition does a¤ect OSS development under the former but not
the latter.
While we do not solve the complete model to determine …rst stage e¤ort levels here, we
can make some conjectures about how competition e¤ects e¤ort provision from developers
under proprietary and N R licenses. First, e¤ort will be weakly decreasing in vB . This is
because there is now a non-negative probability that the stage 2 payo¤ is lower than vA .
As competition leaves e¤ort under the R license unchanged but lower under a N R license,
it is not possible to compare the two licenses without a complete analysis. However, we
can say that when vB is high, the N R license does no better than the R license, while it

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2862560

dominates the proprietary license. Looking at the case where vB > 2N c > vA , we know
that proprietary development of A does not occur. On the other hand, expected payo¤ to
a developer under the N R license in this case is vA which is exactly the same as with a R
license. Thus introducing competition qualitatively changes the relative incentives for OSS
development under di¤erent licenses.

3

Conclusion and Further Research

The basic model laid out in this paper provides a starting point for analyzing a number
of theoretical and empirical issues that surround OSS development. First, even our simple model provides a good empirical test of developers’ motivation. If, all else equal, the
di¤erence in e¤ort between restrictive and non-restrictive OSS licenses is small, it is likely
that reputational concerns rather than user-based incentives are incentivizing developers’
participation. A further con…rmation of this can be achieved if, simultaneously, e¤ort invested into proprietary software is signi…cantly lower than under OSS licenses. Second, we
also show that product market competition plays a crucial role in determining which type of
license performs the best. This result provides a note of caution about interpreting empirical results on developers’participation under di¤erent OSS licenses. None of the empirical
research on developers’participation in OSS controls for competition and hence in our view
greater attention needs to be added as a control variable.
From a theoretical perspective, our basic model can bene…t from a number of generalizations. For example, while we have assumed that the incumbent software producer is
proprietary, it is likely that some of our results on how competition changes e¤ort provision
will change if the existing software had an OSS license. Second, one could also simultaneously model the development of the other software (B) to get a better insight into how
developers choose to participate among software with di¤erent licenses.
Our model can also be extended to look other interesting issues in OSS licensing; particularly, license compatibility, viral licenses and dual licensing. The terms of restrictive
licenses, such as GPL, usually create a con‡ict when the software is combined with other
di¤erently licensed codes. If software (B) is a complement rather than a substitute for the
new software A, then the license for B will have an important e¤ect on the value of A beyond
e¤ort incentives. So if B has a GPL license, A will have a higher value if it also adopts a
GPL license. This is why GPL is sometimes referred to as a viral license.
One way around the problem of license compatibility is to release the software under a
dual license, i.e., both a proprietary license as well as an open source license. Typically, use
of the proprietary license requires a payment to the license owner, while the open source
version requires all modi…cations to be kept open as with the restrictive license. A dual
license allows the license owner to appropriate some of the future proprietary pro…ts generated from the dual licensed software and to allow license compatibility with other software
released under restrictive terms (Valimaki, 2003; Comino and Manenti, 2011.) On the other
hand, the restrictive license poses a competitive threat to the proprietary version especially
if it generates a better software product to users. Incorporating both competitive and complementarity e¤ects of software development into our model will help to disentangle these
trade-o¤s in a dual license.
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4

Appendix

In the following subsections we derive equilibrium e¤ort provision under restrictive and
non-restrictive OSS licenses. We then introduce competition from an existing proprietary
software to derive some preliminary results about the e¤ect of competition on e¤ort provision
under each type of license.

4.1

E¤ort and OSS license

In both types of OSS licenses, developer i receives the reputational payo¤ if and only if
di > max fdj gj6=i . Since we are looking for a symmetric equilibrium, let us …x the e¤ort of
all developers j 6= i as eL , where L 2 fr; nrg represents hthe type of the OSS license.
Then
i
the probability that di > max fdj gj6=i is P (ei ; eL ) = Pr ei "i > eL max f"j gj6=i . Using the
uniform distribution for "i and "j for all j 6= i, this probability can be derived as:
8
0
if ei = 0 and eL 0;
>
>
>
2
N 1
R
>
>
d"i
ei "i
>
if
eL ei > 0;
>
eL 2
2
>
<
0
2eL
(1)
P (ei ; eL ) =
R2 d"i
Rei ei "i N 1 d"i
>
>
+
if
ei eL > 0;
>
>
eL 2
2
2
>
2eL
0
>
>
ei
>
:
1
if eL = 0 and ei > 0:
For eL = 0; lim dP (edeii;eL ) = 1: For eL > 0; di¤erentiating with respect to ei , we get
ei !0
8
N 2
dP (ei ; eL ) < NN 1 e1 eei
if eL ei > 0;
L
L
=
N 1 eL
:
dei
if ei eL > 0:
N (e )2

(2)

i

d2 P (ei ;eL )
de2i

> 0 for ei < eL : Hence P (ei ; eL ) is concave only in the range ei eL > 0 and we
are going to look for a symmetric equilibrium for OSS licenses in this range only.
4.1.1

Restrictive OSS License

Suppose the other N
ei is

1 developers exert er in equilibrium, the payo¤ to developer i from
vrd = P (ei ; er ) S +

(ei + (N

1) er )

cei ,

where the expression for P (ei ; er ) is given in equation (1) with eL = er .
Di¤erentiating with respect to ei and setting eL = er in equation (2), we get
dvrd
N 1 er
=
S
+
dei
N
(ei )2
In a symmetric equilibrium where ei = er , if S
dvrd
dei

c:
N
c
N 1
N 1
S;
N

or if

c

N 1
S, then
N
N 1 S
er = N (c ) :

jei =1 > 0 so that ei = er = 1. For S < NN 1 c and < c
we have ei =
Comparing e¤ort across proprietary and restrictive OSS, we have that ep > er if and only
if 0 S < c and Nc
< c NN 1 S: In all other cases, er ep :
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4.1.2

Non-restrictive OSS License

If developer i exerts e¤ort i and the remaining N 1 developers exert e¤ort enr , the payo¤
to i is:
d
= P (ei ; enr ) [S + N (ei + (N 1) enr )] cei ,
vnr
where P (ei ; enr ) is the same probability described in (1) with eL = enr .
The derivative with respect to ei is
d
N 1 enr
dvnr
=
[S + N (ei + (N
dei
N (ei )2
N 1 enr
=
[S + N (ei + (N
N (ei )2

1) enr )] + P (ei ; enr ) N
1) enr )] + N

1

N

c
1 enr
N ei

Again, as with the restrictive OSS license, in a symmetric equilibrium, for S
1
N +1)

N 1
S
N

d
dvnr

; dei jei =1 > 0 so that ei = enr = 1. For S <
1
c NN 1 S ; we have enr = NN 1 c (N 2S N +1) .
(N 2 N +1)
Comparing with enr , we have that
Comparing enr with er and ep , we get that enr er and enr ep always.
(N 2

4.2

c

N
c
N 1

c:
N
c
N 1

and

or
<

Product Market Competition

We assume that S = 0 and = 1. In the absence of any competition, i.e., if vB = 0, the
results from the previous model with the new parameter assumptions yield the following
e¤ort levels in equilibrium.
Under proprietary software development,
ep =

1 if c N;
0 if c > N:

If software A adopts a restrictive OSS license,
er =

1 if c 1;
0 if c > 1:

(3)

As discussed above, in the absence of reputational bene…ts, the restrictive OSS always
under-performs relative to proprietary software.
Finally, if A adopts a non-restrictive OSS license,
enr =

1 if c N 2
0 if c > (N 2

N + 1;
N + 1) :

Again, the non-restrictive OSS license provides the highest software value of all licenses
since N 2 N + 1 > N > 1.
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4.2.1

Restrictive OSS

If the new software is distributed under a restrictive OSS license, its price is zero. This
means that if vA < vB , then the proprietary price for B will be pB = (vB vA ) and all users
buy software B. If vA
vB , then all users will use A. In both cases, the user surplus to
each developer is vA . Note that since developer’s surplus is independent of vB , the existence
of proprietary competition has no e¤ect on the development of restrictive OSS. So eB
r = er
given in equation (3).
4.2.2

Proprietary

First let us derive the Bertrand Nash Equilibrium in prices when A and B are both proprietary.
Case 1: vB > vA
Given pA , B’s best response is pB = (vB vA + pA ) if pA vA and pB = vB if pA > vA .
If pB = vB ; then A’s best response is pA = vA
where is arbitrarily close to zero. So
this is not an equilibrium.
If pB = (vB vA + pA ) ; then A’s best response is pA = vA vB + pB
where is
arbitrarily close to zero as long as vA vB + pB > 0:
Solving the best response functions for A and B; we get a price equilibrium where pB =
vB vA and pA = 0. This means that proprietor A makes zero revenue.
Case 2: vA vB
Then working in the same manner as in Case 1, we get pA = vA vB and pB = 0. The
total revenue to proprietor A is then N (vA vB ).
4.2.3

Non-Restrictive OSS License

Now let us look at what happens under a non-restrictive OSS license. Price competition
yields the same Bertrand price equilibrium as in the proprietary case. However, the winning
developer’s payo¤s are now di¤erent.
If vA < vB , then each developer gets a user surplus of vA . If vA > vB , then the losing
developer gets a user surplus of vB which is independent of e¤ort; the winning developer
gets a user surplus of vA and revenue from selling software A to the remaining N 1 users,
totaling a revenue of vA + (N 1) (vA vB ).
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